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Abstract 
The options available to European governments to respond to a multinational bank in 
financial trouble have been severely limited since each country has its own unique laws and 
authority applicable to banks operating within its borders. The Bank Recovery & Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), which was adopted in 2013 and scheduled to go into effect January 2015, 
harmonizes rules across EU countries for how to restructure and resolve failing banks. 
However, the directive would maintain the existing system of individual national resolution 
authorities and resolution funds. To better secure the Eurozone banks and to compliment 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which was enacted in April 2014, the European 
Parliament approved the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SRM establishes a Single 
Resolution Board and a single Resolution Fund that will handle bank failures in all EU 
countries participating in the SSM. This case reviews the changes in Eurozone bank 
resolution resulting from the BRRD and the SRM.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1 This case study is one of four by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) considering the European 
Banking Union, other cases are: 
• European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism  
• European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution—Fortis Group 
• European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability. 
3 Principal Expert, European Central Bank, Directorate Financial Stability, Financial Services Policy Division. 
This co-author’s contribution represents his personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the 
European Central Bank or its staff. 
4 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of Management. 
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1.   Introduction  
On April 15, 2014, the European Parliament, responding to the challenges posed by the 
deterioration of numerous banks during the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the 
sovereign debt crisis, which began in late 2009, adopted the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) providing for a super-national resolution of banks in participating member states.  
Since the founding of the EU, many European banks have taken advantage of the EU single 
market and the common euro currency, used in 18 of the 28 EU member states, to expand 
their operations beyond their home countries. However, in 2008, bank supervision was still 
undertaken at the national level, leading to a hodgepodge of varying rules across the EU. 
Additionally, the options available to European governments to respond to a multinational 
bank in financial trouble remained limited by these laws and the relationship between 
governments and the banks located within their borders. The risks posed by these 
limitations were illustrated by the collapse of the Belgian-Dutch bank Fortis Group N.V./SA 
in 2008 and the difficulties surrounding Franco-Belgian bank Dexia Group, SA, which was 
first bailed out in 2008 and then taken into receivership in 2011.5  
As a result, beginning in 2011, the EU adopted several reforms to bank regulation and then, 
determining that additional structural reforms were required to protect the euro, 
established a common banking union for all the member states, the European Banking 
Union.6 
On November 3, 2013, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was enacted, providing that 
as of November 4, 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) would become the supervising 
authority for all 6,000 banks in the Eurozone (though the National Supervising Authorities 
[NSAs] continued to play a significant role). In light of the SSM, it became even clearer that it 
would be inconsistent to have the supervision of Eurozone banks be centralized at the 
European level while resolution of such banks remained decentralized at the national level, 
lest a situation arise where an SSM-supervised bank was to be resolved by its various NSAs.  
To respond to this dilemma, in April 2014 the European Parliament adopted regulations 
establishing the SRM to govern resolution of all banks subject to the SSM (i.e., banks located 
in the Eurozone and in any member state opting into the SSM). The SRM established a Single 
Resolution Board (SR Board) to oversee resolutions and a Single Resolution Fund (SR Fund) 
to finance such resolutions. As with the SSM, however, the national resolution authorities 
(NRAs) would continue to play a major role under the SRM.  
Pursuant to the SRM, the SR Board was to implement in the Eurozone the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD)—adopted by the European Parliament in April 2014—which 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Dexia and Fortis are discussed in YPFS case studies Wiggins, et al 2014C and Wiggins, et al. 2014D. 
6 The European Banking Union encompasses (1) Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), (2) Single Rulebook, (3) 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme, and (4) Single Resolution Mechanism and Common Resolution Fund (European 
Commission Memo 12/656). 
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established uniform rules for how failing banks throughout the entire EU were to be 
restructured and resolved. The BRRD made a significantly enhanced variety of resolution 
tools uniformly available across the EU, and shifted the costs of funding resolutions from the 
national governments and taxpayers to the bank shareholders and the banks themselves.7 
These changes were intended to break the cycle of debilitation between banks and their 
sovereign governments that saw the financial stability of several countries seriously 
weakened during the crises. 
 
This case will provide participants with an understanding of the SRM and enable them to 
examine the purposes of the BRRD and SRM, and to consider whether the structure of the 
SRM fulfills its stated purposes. The rest of this module is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the harmonized EU resolution regime of which the SRM is a part. Section 3 
describes the components of the SRM. Section 4 addresses the SR Board. Section 5 explains 
the resolution tools available. Section 6 describes how the resolution process is initiated, and 
lastly, Section 7 discusses the SR Fund. 
Questions 
1. How “singular” is the SRM?  
2. Why is the SRM needed in addition to the BRRD?  
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the SRM?  
4. How likely is the multistep resolution approval process to be effective in the midst of 
a real-time crisis?  
5. Is the projected size and schedule for funding the SR Fund optimal for its purpose?  
6. How will bank failures be handled during the transition period before the SR Fund is 
fully funded?  
7. Will the SRM help to break the negative feedback loop between sovereign debt and 
banking debt of EU member states, and if so, how?  
2. The Harmonized EU Resolution Regime 
The harmonized EU resolution regime has been achieved through the congruence of three 
EU initiatives: (1) the BRRD, which set out a new framework for bank recovery and 
resolutions for EU banks and was applicable to all banks in all member states, (2) the SRM, 
which implemented the BRRD in the Eurozone and, (3) the Single Resolution Fund, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
7 The NRAs of individual member states not in the Eurozone and thus not subject to the SRM would continue 
to be responsible for implementing the new rules, and the funding of such resolutions would remain at the 
national level.  
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shifted the cost of resolving failing banks from the taxpayers onto the shareholders and the 
banks themselves.  
The BRRD required each member state to establish a National Resolution Authority (NRA), 
which could be done by granting these powers to an existing supervisory authority, and a 
national resolution fund (The BRRD was also incorporated into the Single Rule Book, which 
is the compendium of the harmonized banking rules applicable to all EU member states). The 
NRAs were responsible for the functions and the tasks relating to the resolution under the 
BRRD in those member states not subject to the SRM. Bank resolutions not subject to the 
SRM and overseen by an NRA were to be funded by the respective national resolution fund. 
The European Banking Union 
As the financial crisis evolved into the sovereign debt crisis, it became clear that additional 
actions were needed to place the Eurozone’s banking sector on a sounder footing and restore 
confidence in the euro. In June 2012, a proposal was floated to create a Banking Union to 
ensure common implementation of the new banking standards in the Eurozone. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the three8 pillars of the of Banking Union are (1) the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, providing for the centralized supervision of banks in the Eurozone 
by the ECB, (2) the Single Resolution Mechanism, providing for centralized resolution of 
banks in the Eurozone and a Common Resolution Fund, and (3) Harmonized Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes, providing greater support for Eurozone depositors (See European 
Commission (2012) for further discussion of the Banking Union). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
8 The Single Rulebook has, at times, also been referred to as a pillar of the EU banking reform. 
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Figure 1: The European Banking Union 
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
3. The SRM and its Components 
Within the SRM, the BRRD applies to the participating member states. Furthermore, the SRM 
is closely aligned with the SSM in that it creates a regulatory continuum. In the case that an 
entity or group supervised in a uniform manner under the SSM starts to deteriorate, the SRM 
ensures that it would also be resolved on a centralized basis.9 
The SRM established a new European agency, the SR Board, to be the authority responsible 
for implementing and enforcing the terms of the BRRD with respect to all entities that fall 
under the SSM (SRM Regulation, Article 2). As illustrated by Figure 2, the SR Board is at the 
center of the SRM system, which also includes NRAs that will continue to play a role in 
resolving certain banks. Effective operation requires close cooperation with the ECB and the 
National Supervising Authorities. The SR Board is also charged with establishing and 
administering the SR Fund (Ibid., Article 64). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
9 See the European Commission proposal to establish the SRM, which includes the legislative history and 
further discusses this point (SRM Regulation Proposal). 
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Figure 2: Components of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
 
Source: European Commission: A Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union. 
 
Entities Covered by the SRM 
The SRM applies to: 
• Credit institutions established in a participating member state 
• Parent undertakings, including financial holding companies and mixed financial 
holding companies, established in a participating member state, if they are subject to 
consolidated supervision by the ECB 
• Investment firms and financial institutions established in a participating member 
state, if they are subject to consolidated supervision by the ECB 
Specifically, the SR Board is responsible for the resolution of: 
• The 120 systemically important bank groups, deemed “significant” under the SSM 
• Approximately 200 cross-border banks that operate in more than one member state  
• Any resolution involving use of the SR Fund 
Similar to terms of the SSM, the NRAs are responsible for resolution of other banks subject 
to the SRM. However, at any time, the SR Board can assume direct responsibility for any such 
entity. A member state can also opt to have the SR Board exercise direct responsibility over 
all of its banks by submitting to supervision under the SSM. Framers of the SRM intended 
that all banks in the EU be subject to the terms of the BRRD and all resolution authorities 
have the same resolution tools, thereby resulting in a harmonized and unified system of bank 
resolution. Having resolution decisions regarding banks in the Eurozone decided by the SR 
Board, which can effectively address systemic and cross-border issues, also furthers this 
objective. The required resolution funds are intended to shift the burden of bailing out banks 
from the taxpayers to the banks’ shareholders and to the banks themselves. 
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As with the SRM, non-European banks are not governed by the SRM, although their branches 
located in the EU continue to be governed by their applicable NRA, which applies the 
harmonized rules under the BRRD and has the tools specified therein available to it. 
Provisions of the SRM relating to the preparation of resolution plans, the collection of 
information, and national cooperation became effective as of January 1, 2015. The remaining 
provisions, including those relating to early intervention, resolution planning, and resolution 
actions, become effective January 1, 2016. 
4. The Single Resolution Board and Decision Making 
The SRM established a new EU agency located in Brussels, the SR Board, which is responsible 
for implementing the SRM. The board is comprised of:  
• A chair 
• Four independent, full-time members who shall act in the interest of the EU as a whole 
(permanent members) 
• Two permanent observing members, one appointed by each of the ECB and the 
Commission (collectively the observing members) 
• A member appointed by each member state subject to the SRM representing its NRA  
The SR Board operates in two types of sessions, executive and plenary. As discussed below 
and shown in Figure 3, each member including the chair has one vote (excluding observing 
members).  
Executive Sessions 
Generally executive sessions are composed of the chair, permanent members, and observing 
members, with decisions being made by a simple majority of members entitled to vote. When 
deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group, however, the executive session also 
includes the SR Board members appointed by the member states that are directly involved 
in such resolution (i.e., where the group-level country and any subsidiary or entity covered 
by consolidated supervision is established). If the participating members are not able to 
reach a consensus agreement by the deadline set by the chair, the chair and the permanent 
members decide by a simple majority (SRM Regulation, Article 53 and 55). 
Plenary Sessions 
All SR Board members participate in plenary sessions, which are held at least two times a 
year. When deciding issues of a general nature, such as the annual work plan or budget, or 
rules of procedure, action is by simple majority vote. The chair casts the deciding vote in case 
of a tie.  
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Whenever a resolution scheme requires more than €5 billion (€10 billion in liquidity 
support) from the SR Fund, any member of the plenary may request (within strict deadlines) 
that the plenary session decide the matter instead of the executive session. In such cases, a 
simple majority vote that represents at least 30% of SR Fund contributions is required. 
Figure 3: Single Resolution Board Decision Making 
Type of Session Composition Voting Duties 
Executive A Chair, permanent 
members, observing 
members. 
All except observing 
members have one 
vote. 
• Matters not involving the 
resolution of a bank. 
Executive B-
Resolution of 
entity or group 







the member states 
where the entity or 
group is located.  
All except observing 
members have one vote. 
Chair and permanent 
members can decide by 
simple majority vote if 
decision deadline is not 
met by larger group. 
• Prepare all decisions 
considering resolution 
procedure and adopt those 
decisions. 
Executive C-
Resolution of a 
cross-border 
group (an entity 
or group 







the member states 
where the entity or 
group is located. 
 
All except observing 
members have one vote. 
Chair and permanent 
members can decide by 
simple majority vote if 
decision deadline is not 
met by larger group. 
• Prepare all decisions 
considering resolution 
procedure and adopt those 
decisions.  




all member states 
participating in the 
SSM/SRM.  
All except observing 
members have one vote, 
and a simple majority is 
decisive, except that 
when a decision is 
regarding use of the SR 
Fund, a simple majority 
vote that represents at 
least 30% of SR Fund 
contributions is required. 
• Meets at least twice a year. 
• Handles issues of general 
nature: annual work program, 
budget, rules of procedure. 
• Upon specific request from any 
plenary member (within strict 
deadlines), decides on 
resolution schemes that 
require use of the SR Fund in 
excess of €5 billion (or €10 
billion in liquidity support).  
• Decides issues re: the raising of 
ex post (future) contributions 
from banks, voluntary 
borrowing between financing 
arrangements, alternative 
financing means, and 
mutualization of national 
financing arrangements.  
Source: SRM Regulation. 
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5. The Resolution Toolkit 
The SRM vests in the SR Board authority to implement certain terms of the BRRD in the 
Eurozone and requires a close integration with the ECB under the SSM. The BRRD is intended 
to ensure that resolution authorities have a common set of useful tools available to resolve 
any bank that fails, particularly in the case of cross-border bank failures. Implementation by 
the SRM ensures that cross-border and systemic banks are resolved in a manner that takes 
into consideration their unique characteristics and potentially broad impacts.  
The tools available under the BRRD are divided into three categories: resolution planning, 
early intervention powers, and resolution.  
Resolution Planning 
The SRM requires the SR Board to draft resolution plans and to adopt all decisions relating 
to resolution for the entities and groups that are under direct ECB supervision (pursuant to 
the SSM) and all cross-border groups. Each resolution plan must describe how the SR Board 
or NRA would resolve the entity in the event of financial deterioration (including systemic 
instability scenarios) by applying the resolution tools and utilizing the SR Fund.  
Plans must be drafted at the entity and group level. The plans are to be drawn up in 
consultation with the bank’s supervisor and the NRA in the member state in which the bank 
is located. EU-based subsidiaries of non-EU entities are also required to have a plan. See 
Appendix A for details of what elements are to be included in the resolution plan. 
If the SR Board identifies an impediment to resolution, the board has the authority to request 
the entity to change its legal or operational structures to ensure that it can be resolved with 
the available tools in a manner that does not compromise critical functions, threaten 
financial stability, or involve costs to the taxpayer (See SRM Regulation, Articles 8, 10 for 
more on resolution planning.). 
The Early Intervention Powers  
Under the BRRD, when a bank’s financial condition deteriorates so that it fails to meet, or is 
likely to fail to meet, its regulatory capital requirements, supervisory authorities (the ECB or 
NSA, as applicable) may exercise certain early intervention powers. These powers include 
requiring the bank to: 
• Undertake any of the steps set out in its recovery plan (required under the 
SSM)  
• Draw up an action program and a timetable for its implementation 
• Hold a shareholders’ meeting to adopt emergency steps 
• Draw up a plan for restructuring its debt with its creditors 
The supervisor may also appoint a special manager to restore the financial condition of the 
bank. The supervisor has sole responsibility with regard to early intervention measures. 
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However, the ECB or other supervisory authority must notify the SR Board when it exercises 
any early intervention power against a bank. Upon receiving such notice, the board shall 
notify the European Commission and may begin to make preliminary plans for the bank’s 
resolution. The ECB or the relevant NSA shall provide the SR Board with all of the 
information necessary in order to update the bank’s resolution plan and prepare for the 
possible resolution of the institution and for valuation of its assets and liabilities.  
Resolution Powers and Tools 
In the event that the financial condition of an entity or group is deteriorating, and corrective 
intervening actions do not arrest the decline, resolution may be initiated pursuant to the 
SRM (See Initiating the Resolution Process below.). Resolution authorities have the power to 
take over a bank that is failing, to take over decision-making authority from the bank’s 
shareholders and managers, to transfer assets and liabilities, and to amend, close out, and 
terminate contracts. Resolution authorities have a number of specific tools at their disposal. 
Sale of part of the business. Resolution authorities would be able to sell all or parts of the 
failing bank. The sale would have to be on commercial terms, but the consent of shareholders 
would not be required.  
Establishment of a bridge institution. Resolution authorities could establish a publicly 
controlled entity and transfer instruments, assets, rights and liabilities of the failing bank to 
it in order to ensure continuity of critical functions and avoid significant adverse effects on 
financial stability until a sale of the business can be conducted. The value of liabilities 
transferred cannot exceed the value of assets and rights transferred or provided from other 
sources. The new entity would have to be licensed and comply with bank capital 
requirements and would operate as a commercial concern until market conditions enable it 
to be sold, in whole or parts, to a private sector purchaser.  
Asset separation tool. Resolution authorities would be able to transfer impaired assets of 
the failing bank into an asset management vehicle where they can be wound down over time. 
It is intended that this tool only be used as a supplement to the others.  
The bail-in tool. Resolution authorities would be able to write down or convert into equity 
the claims of a broad scope of creditors.10 Claims that are client-related and employee-
related, are excluded from bail-in. Others claims may be excluded by the authorities, for 
example, if it is not possible to bail them in within a reasonable time. However, in order to 
prevent this flexibility from being used to shield creditors from losses, the SR Fund cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
10 “Under the BRRD, the order in which the creditors subject to the bail-in would be affected is: subordinated 
liabilities, unsecured and non-preferred liabilities, eligible deposits from natural persons and micro-, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, and finally, the applicable deposit guarantee scheme (DGS). The DGS would step 
in and make the contribution for covered deposits (i.e., eligible deposits up to €100,000) if needed, given that 
covered deposits are excluded from bail-in” (ECB 2014, 45).  
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be used to cover for excluded liabilities until an amount of at least 8% of the total liabilities, 
including own funds, of a bank have been bailed in (ECB 2014, 45-6). 
The bail-in provision is designed to shift the financial burden of resolving failing banks from 
the taxpayers to the banks’ shareholders and creditors (bail-in) and then to the banks 
themselves (the fund) (European Commission Memo 14/295). The tool permits the 
authorities to mimic a bankruptcy in that creditors’ claims may be reduced or they may have 
their claim converted to equity, thus reducing the total liabilities of the bank, and presumably 
the amount taxpayers would have to pay to support it.  
6. Initiating the Resolution Process 
If the preventive and early intervention measures fail to stem the deterioration of a bank, the 
resolution powers may be invoked by the SR Board or NRA, as applicable. A bank may only 
be put into resolution if the following conditions are met:  
• The entity is failing or is likely to fail;  
• Having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable 
prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action, 
including early intervention measures, would prevent its failure within a reasonable 
timeframe; and  
• A resolution action is necessary in the public interest. 
 
Due to the extraordinary nature of a decision to resolve a bank, the SRM employs a decision-
making process that is intended to be both thorough and quick. Under the SRM, the 
determination to initiate the resolution process lies initially with the ECB, which shall make 
an assessment of whether a bank is failing or is likely to fail after consulting with the SR 
Board. If the ECB assesses that the bank is failing or is likely to fail, it shall immediately 
communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the SR Board. As shown in Figure 4, 
for some smaller banks, which would not require tapping the SR Fund, the NRA rather than 
the ECB would be the initiating authority.  
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Figure 4: How the SRM Allocates Resolution Authority 
Type of Bank Resolution Planning Resolution  Responsible Entity 
“Significant” bank 
supervised directly by 
ECB 
SR Board SR Board SR Board, but NRA implements 
the resolution scheme under SR 
Board direction.  
Cross-border 
bank/group 
SR Board SR Board SR Board, but NRA implements 
the resolution scheme under SR 
Board direction.  
All other banks/SR Fund 
to be used 
NRA SR Board SR Board, but NRA implements 
the resolution scheme under SR 
Board direction.  
All other banks/SR Fund 
not to be used 
NRA NRA NRA 
Source: Project Editor Notes. 
 
Given its macroprudential oversight role, if the SR Board believes that a bank is failing or 
about to fail, it shall notify the ECB of its intention to make such a determination. If the ECB 
does not make such an assessment within three days of receiving notification from the SR 
Board, the board may make such an assessment in its executive session. The ECB shall 
immediately provide the SR Board with any relevant information that the board requests in 
order to inform its assessment.  
Following a finding by the ECB or the SR Board that point (a) has been met with respect to 
an entity, an assessment of the condition referred to in point (b) shall be made by the SR 
Board, in its executive session, or (where applicable) by the NRAs, in close cooperation with 
the ECB. The ECB may also inform the Board or the NRAs concerned that it considers the 
condition of point (b) to be met. 
If the SR Board finds that the three conditions set forth above are met, it shall adopt a 
resolution scheme and immediately transmit the same to the Commission. The resolution 
scheme will become effective upon the earlier of: (i) it is approved by the Commission, or (ii) 
there are no objections from the Council or the Commission within 24 hours after its 
adoption by the SR Board. According to the ECB: 
The Council becomes involved in the decision making only at the explicit request of 
the Commission. Within 12 hours of the transmission of the resolution scheme [from 
the SR Board], the Commission may propose to the Council to object to the resolution 
scheme. The grounds on which the Council may object to the resolution scheme are 
strictly limited to the existence of a public interest and to material modifications by 
the Commission of the amount of the use of the SR Fund as proposed by the SR Board. 
The Council should, within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme 
by the SR Board, either approve the scheme or object to the Commission’s proposal 
by a simple majority decision, without amending it. The Council or the Commissions 
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shall provide reasons for the exercise of their power of objection. The SR Board shall 
within eight hours modify the resolution scheme accordingly and instruct the 
national resolution authorities, which should take all necessary measures to 
implement the resolution scheme. This implies that a resolution decision can be made 
over a weekend, even when a scheme is modified by the Commission/Council.” (ECB 
2014, 43) 
See Appendix B for more detail regarding the resolution initiating process. 
7. The Single Resolution Fund  
The Bank Sovereign Loop 
European banks have traditionally held significant amounts of their home countries’ 
sovereign debt. The sovereign debt crisis, however, focused attention on the possible 
negative consequences of this close relationship. As banks encountered troubles, their host 
country governments were forced into bailing them out to avoid collapse. As the sovereigns 
struggled to raise monies to support distressed banks, their credit ratings suffered, and 
foreign investors retreated. The governments then relied even more on their domestic 
banks—often the very banks that they were rescuing—to buy up their debt and fund their 
budget deficits, some of which were enormous, given that in some cases the banking sector 
that the government was trying to rescue exceeded the country’s GDP by several factors.  
Given banks’ significant holdings of the debt of their home sovereign governments, however, 
the impairment of the government debt impacted the banks’ stability and, in many cases, 
created a need for additional government assistance. The weakened rating of the sovereign 
impacted its ability to raise funds, causing further downward pressure on its debt. These 
impacts then spilled over to the banks that held sovereign debt, pressuring them to mark to 
market and raise additional capital (See Figure 5)11. 
Several member states, such as Belgium, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain 
experienced severe trauma to the sovereigns as they struggled to support their banking 
sectors. This tight correlation of sovereigns and their home banks has been criticized by 
many commentators, including Chairman of the European Banking Authority, Andrea Enria, 
who in 2011 termed this situation a “dangerous feedback loop” (Enria 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 One reason for this national concentration is that sovereign debt has been excluded from the risk weighting 
that applied to other assets for purposes of calculating bank capital requirements under Basel II and III. Thus, 
banks could take on unlimited amounts of sovereign debt without increasing capital to support it, which 
although not impacting their capital requirements, did impact their liquidity. As a result, many European banks 
held high amounts of sovereign debt. However, it should be noted that the capital requirements treated all EU 
sovereign debt the same, so concentrations in home country debt are not totally explained by this.   
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National Resolution Funds Required 
The BRRD requires that each member state establish a national resolution fund to receive 
contributions from banks and financial institutions in their respective member state to 
provide for the cost of resolving an entity or group (A member state may also make other 
financing arrangements rather than establish a fund.). Along with the bail-in provisions of 
the BRRD, the resolution funds are a critical element in breaking the feedback loop between 
sovereigns and banks. It is designed to shift the financial burden of bailing out banks from 
the taxpayers to the banks’ shareholders and creditors (bail-in) and then to the banks 
themselves (the fund) (European Commission Memo 14/295). 
Beginning in 2016, for Eurozone banks, the Single Resolution Fund will serve as a centralized 
fund for all banks located in SRM-participating member states. The SR Fund will be financed 
through bank contributions raised at the national level and transferred to the SR Board, to 
be pooled at the EU level (An intergovernmental agreement governs the transfer and 
progressive mutualization of those contributions into a single fund.). Contributions to the 
fund will be determined pursuant to the SRM Regulation and an Implementing Act specifying 
the calculation method. Contributions will be comprised of a flat part and a risk-adjusted 
part so that banks with riskier operational profiles will contribute greater amounts. 
The SR Fund is targeted to reach one percent of the combined covered deposits of the 
regulated banks, based on 2010 data—an estimated €55 billion target size—within an eight-
year transition period starting from 2016.  
Figure 5: Sovereign and Bank Debt Cycle 
 
Source: European Banking Authority. 
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Transition Period Guidelines & Mutualization 
During the transition period, the SR Board will allocate funds to separate compartments of 
the SR Fund corresponding to each member state (ECB 2014, 43). This will facilitate (in 
accordance with SRM guidelines) each member state financing a larger proportion of 
resolutions that occur within its borders during the early years of the fund. These guidelines 
also address concerns regarding mutualization (comingling) of the fund. According to the 
ECB: 
[W]hen there is a need to draw on the [SR Fund] in the transition period, national 
compartments of the affected Member States will be used first, up to a predefined 
limit set for each year in the transition period. This limit will decrease during the 
transition period, starting at 100% in the first year; the limit will be 60% and 40% for 
the second and third year, respectively, and thereafter decrease by 6.67% annually 
for the subsequent years. As a second step, only if the first step was insufficient, all 
compartments will contribute up to predefined [mutualization] limit, also set for each 
year in the transition period…. As a third step, if the previous steps were insufficient, 
the remaining resources in the national compartments of the affected Member States 
will be used. (Ibid, 44.) 
If these three steps are still insufficient, future (ex post) contributions from the institutions 
in the affected member states will be used. If these are not immediately accessible, including 
for reasons relating to financial stability, the SR Board may exercise its power to contract for 
the SR Fund borrowings or other forms of support or to make temporary transfers between 
compartments (Ibid, 44.) The guidelines are set out in Appendix C. 
Mutualization  
The separate accounts will be subject to mutualization (i.e., comingling of the funds into one 
common fund) and will cease to exit at the end of the eight-year transition period. The rate 
of mutualization was a heavily debated topic; some member states with fairly strong banking 
sectors expressed concern that they would be required to subsidize weaker banking sectors 
in other member states.  
It was finally decided that mutualization would occur gradually, and a stepped-in, front-
loaded plan was agreed upon. Forty percent of the fund will be mutualized in the first year, 
60% in the second year, and an additional 6.7% in each year thereafter. Full mutualization, 
100%, will be reached in the eighth year (ECB 2014, 43-4) (See Figure 6 for chart showing 
the buildup and mutualization of the SR Fund.).  
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Figure 6: SR Fund Mutualization 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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Appendix A: Information To Be Included In Recovery Plans 
The recovery plan shall include the following information: 
(1) A summary of the key elements of the plan, strategic analysis, and summary of 
overall recovery capacity; 
(2) A summary of the material changes to the institution since the most recently filed 
recovery plan; 
(3) A communication and disclosure plan outlining how the firm intends to manage 
any potentially negative market reactions; 
(4) A range of capital and liquidity actions required to maintain operations of, and 
funding for, the institution’s critical functions and business lines; 
(5) An estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan; 
(6) A detailed description of any material impediment to the effective and timely 
execution of the plan, including consideration of impact on the rest of the group, 
customers and counterparties; 
(7) Identification of critical functions; 
(8) A detailed description of the processes for determining the value and 
marketability of the core business lines, operations and assets of the institution; 
(9) A detailed description of how recovery planning is integrated into the corporate 
governance structure of the institution as well as the policies and procedures 
governing the approval of the recovery plan and identification of the persons in the 
organization responsible for preparing and implementing the plan; 
(10) Arrangements and measures to conserve or restore the institution’s own funds; 
(11) Arrangements and measures to ensure that the institution has adequate access 
to contingency funding sources, including potential liquidity sources, an assessment 
of available collateral and an assessment of the possibility to transfer liquidity across 
group entities and business lines, to ensure that it can carry on its operations and 
meet its obligations as they fall due; 
(12) Arrangements and measures to reduce risk and leverage; 
(13) Arrangements and measures to restructure liabilities; 
(14) Arrangements and measures to restructure business lines;  
(15) Arrangements and measures necessary to maintain continuous access to 
financial markets infrastructures; 
(16) Arrangements and measures necessary to maintain the continuous functioning 
of the institution’s operational processes, including infrastructure and IT services; 
(17) Preparatory arrangements to facilitate the sale of assets or business lines in a 
timeframe appropriate for the restoration of financial soundness; 
(18) Other management actions or strategies to restore financial soundness and the 
anticipated financial effect of those actions or strategies; 
(19) Preparatory measures that the institution has taken or plans to take in order to 
facilitate the implementation of the recovery plan, including those necessary to 
enable the timely recapitalization of the institution.  
Source: BRRD, Annex- Section A**.   
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Appendix B: Timetable for Initiating the Resolution Process 
7. In practice what will each step involve? 
Step 1: The ECB, after consultation with the Board, determines that the first condition for 
resolution is met and informs the Commission and the Board. The Executive Board [the SR 
Board] may make that determination if the ECB, within three days of having been informed 
by the Board about its intention to make that determination, does not make it.  
Step 2: The Executive Board, in close cooperation with the ECB, determines that the second 
condition for resolution is met. The ECB may also inform the Board that the second condition 
for resolution is met.  
Step 3: The Executive Board adopts a resolution scheme when it assesses that the three 
conditions for resolution are met, and, immediately after adoption, it transmits it to the 
Commission.  
Step 4A: Within 24 hours after transmission, the Commission either endorses the resolution 
scheme, or objects to it, with regard to the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme in 
the cases not covered in Step 4B. The Commission provides reasons for the exercise of its 
power of objection.  
Step 4B: Within 12 hours after transmission, the Commission may propose to the Council: 
to object (within 12 hours) to the resolution scheme on the ground that it does not fulfill the 
third condition for resolution; or to approve or object (within 12 hours) to a material 
modification of the amount of Fund provided for in the resolution scheme. The Council 
provides reasons for the exercise of its power of objection. If the Council objects to the 
resolution scheme on the ground that it does not fulfill the third condition for resolution, the 
entity is orderly wound up in accordance with the applicable national law.  
Step 5A: The resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed 
by the Council, or by the Commission, within 24 hours after transmission.  
Step 5B: Within eight hours, the Board modifies the resolution scheme in accordance with 
the reasons expressed by the Commission, in its objection under Step 4A, or by the Council, 
in its approval of the modification proposed by the Commission under Step 4B.  
Source: European Commission, A Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union-
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Appendix C: SR Fund Approval Authority 
Type of 
Session 




entity or group 





representative from the 
member state in which 
the entity or group is 
located. 
A simple majority is needed. Observing 
members do not vote. 
Can approve use of SR Fund 
without limit, subject to plenary 
rights.  
Executive B-
Resolution of a 
cross-border 
group, an entity 
or group located 





representatives from the 
member states in which 
the group operates.  
A simple majority is needed. Observing 
members do not vote. 
Can approve use of SR Fund 





are located and 




members, and members 
of SR Board and 
representatives from all 
member states 
participating in the SRM.  
Decisions involving use of SR Fund 
monies require a simple majority of SR 
Board members in the session 
representing at least 30% of 
contributions to the SR Fund. 
Observing members do not vote. 
If use of SR Fund is anticipated to 
be in excess of €5 billion (or €10 
billion in liquidity support), any 
member of the plenary can 
(within strict deadlines) request 
that the plenary consider the 
resolution rather than the 
executive session. Can approve 














members, and members 
of SR Board and 
representatives from all 
member states 
participating in the SRM.  
 
• During the eight-year phase-in 
period, approval by a 2/3 majority 
of SR Board members 
representing at least 50% of 
contributions is required.  
• In the “steady state” period (once 
the SR Fund is fully mutualized), a 
2/3 majority of board members 
representing 30% of 
contributions, will be required. 
• Observing members do not vote. 
Can approve use of SR Fund 
without limit. 
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